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EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL JOURNAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE: "We Have to Breathe" 
BY RONALD TRAYLOR 
The community of Barrett Station, located in the eastern portion of 
Harris County, Texas, lies about 20 miles northwest of the city of Hous-
ton. Named after the freedman Harrison Barrett, many Barrett Station 
residents trace their ancestry to the Barrett family and other 19th century 
freedmen who joined the Barretts to create a black majority community. 
The Barrett family, unlike most freedmen in post-Civil War Texas, owned 
their own land. Being real property owners meant that the Barretts con-
trolled their own economic destiny and, unlike many of their black neigh-
bors, successfully avoided sharecropping. Such economic independence 
permitted the Barretts to become leaders who served as an example to 
their marginalized neighbors. As the years passed and more blacks made 
the transition themselves from being dependent sharecroppers to inde-
pendent land owners, the people of Barrett Station adopted the indepen-
dent, self-sufficient attitudes demonstrated by the Barrett family. Such 
attitudes served the people of Barrett Station well. 
They worked hard to create, maintain, defend and improve all aspects 
of life in their community, struggling to free themselves from white con-
trol, racism or outside interference but always within the racial realities of 
the late 191h and early 20th centuries. They established Shiloh Missionary 
Baptist Church in 1879 and the Roman Catholic parish of St. Martin de 
Porres Catholic Church in 1944. 
The struggle against white bias in education began late in the 191h 
century, but the residents of Barrett Station won their long battle against 
segregation in education in 1970, in large part the result offinally exercis-
ing the right to vote. For people without great financial or legal resourc-
es, their more than century-old attempts to resist marginalization and to 
control their own destiny had borne remarkable successes. 
Ronald Traylor is an Instructor of History at Southeastern Louisiana 
University. 
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By the second half of the 20th century and unknown to them, a new 
threat that imperiled their very lives loomed over their community. This 
time the danger did not originate with local adversaries. Rather, it came 
in the form of a faceless, often invisible menace, posed by the dumping 
in their neighborhood of toxic wastes produced by some of the largest 
corporations of the nation. 1 
The people of Barrett Station quickly learned that the struggle against 
injustice did not end with black churches, unified schools or enfranchise-
ment. The new battles against those who contaminate the air they breathed 
and the water they drank replaced the old struggles. As in the past, res-
idents of Barrett Station used the resources available to them and drew 
from their learned empowerment to take the fight to those responsible for 
the deadly chemicals. Their battle against the local toxic waste dump, 
because of the unprecedented scope and threat of the danger, resulted in 
equally unusual resistance. For the first time, Barrett Station residents 
would not fight alone, but in the company of their white and Hispanic 
neighbors. That cooperation, so critical to success in the struggle against 
a contaminated environment, laid a foundation for respect and mutual 
help that continues in the community into the 21 st Century.2 
In 1966 a consortium of manufacturers began to dump toxic chem-
icals into a sand pit on the San Jacinto River less than one-quarter of a 
mile from Harrison Barrett's original homestead. It was that event that 
forced Barrett Station residents into their next round of legal and social 
activism, activities to which they had grown accustomed. This time it 
was not a struggle of newly empowered blacks against politically en-
trenched whites, and it produced a confusing scenario in which the enemy 
a_t times seemed to be the nation's largest corporations, while at other 
times it seemed to be the United States government itself. 
Some ecologists have defined environmental justice as "meeting hu-
man needs and enhancing the quality of life using resources sustainably." 
In an environmentally just society, citizens have equal access to natural 
re ources, and the right to clean air and water. Failure to satisfy those 
~eeds was normally not an accident. Rather, it was the result of institu-
~onal decisions, marketing practices, discrimination and an endless quest 
or economic growth.3 
h Local poor and lower middle class whites in Riverdale, adjacent to 
t e ~an Jacinto River, suffered along with historically socially and eco-
norn ,cally marginalized blacks of Barrett Station. Such injustices against 
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the economically disadvantaged often resulted in part from a lack of po-
litical power, and affected the entire fabric of social life. The political 
empowerment recently demonstrated by black citizens of the Crosby In-
dependent School District certainly gave them a powerful voice in local 
educational matters. Whether their agency, even when augmented by that 
of poor whites, would be sufficient was questionable, for their foes mar-
shaled power on a grand scale, difficult to confront successfully.4 
Industrial pollution of the environment in America was a phenome-
non unique neither to the twentieth century nor to southeast Texas. Be-
ginning in the nineteenth century, the United States moved toward steam 
and then electricity to power factories and plants. The resulting coal 
smoke from furnace stacks began to cloud the skies. Laborers worked, 
and lived with their families within an omnipresent cloud of factory dust 
and industrial soot. Pollution also took other forms. Noxious smells and 
chemicals in the air, water, and ground were not, however, limited to 
Chicago. Contaminants became a prominent feature of the industrial pol-
lution present around the world and, and, due to the rate of industrial 
growth in and around nearby Houston and its accompanying production 
of toxic by-product, made their appearance in the San Jacinto River pit 
by 1966.5 
The toxic waste dump that created such dangers for the citizens of 
Barrett Station is called the French Limited site. Situated a little less 
than one mile from the east bank of the San Jacinto River, and within its 
alluvial I 00-year flood plain, it was near three communities. Its closest 
distance to the predominately white town of Crosby was less than two 
miles, while its closest distance to the nearest homes contained within the 
community of Barrett Station was about one-quarter of a mile. Although 
the white residential community of Riverdale lies in immediate proximity 
to the site, about 600 feet, for al I practical purposes it affected Barrett Sta-
tion and Riverdale equally. Bounded on the north by Old U.S. Highway 
90 and on the south by Gulf Pump Road, the site had a triangular shape. 
Its elevation, only 10 feet above mean sea level, made it susceptible to 
frequent flooding. 6 
The entire site comprised about 22.5 acres, with a 7.3-acre lagoon 
within the larger site marking the location where most waste dumping 
occurred. The land was originally operated as a commercial sandpit be-
tween 1950 and 1965. In 1966, four years prior to the creation of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, ten years before the establishment of the 
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Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and fourteen years before the 
passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act, the Houston-based industrial waste disposal company, 
French Limited, Inc. prepared the sand pit for use as a dump site for liquid 
industrial wastes.7 
What prompted French Limited to choose the spent sand pit for the 
dumping operation? Even the leaders of Barrett Station did not and still 
do not believe racism to be the overarching reason for the establishment 
of the dump at that location. Rather, it seems to have been a combination 
of economics and disregard for the needs of local residents. The earli-
er extraction of most of the available sand and gravel made the sandpit 
worthless for its original purpose. It was located in an area populated by 
poor blacks and whites, two groups never given much thought by corpo-
rate America. The decision to dump toxic waste at the sandpit must have 
been deliberate, based on the socio-economic condition oflocal residents. 
The establishment of such an operation located within the same distance 
from affluent residential neighborhoods, particularly white ones, was 
inconceivable. The answer is likely very simple: the dumpers regarded 
poor local citizens as so powerless as to be helpless and accordingly, did 
not expect any consequences for their actions.8 
The construction of an earthen levee around the site and the instal-
lation of tanks, other holding vessels, and incineration equipment pre-
pared the location for the conversion from a sand and gravel pit to a toxic 
waste dump facility. Many area petrochemical companies with nearby 
plant locations began to dispose of their liquid industrial waste at the 
site. Some companies stored their wastes in large tanks transported to the 
site, and later disposed of them by incinerating them at French Limited. 
The vast majority of the liquid chemical wastes, however, were simply 
dumped into the unlined sandpit. The dumping occurred legally, under 
terms spelled out by a Petrochemical Waste Disposal dumping permit is-
sued by the Texas Water Quality Board. By the time that dumping ceased 
at French Limited in 1972, the pit contained more than 3.4 million cubic 
feet, or approximately 35,000,000 gallons, of liquid industrial wastes. In 
1973, largely due to complaints by Barrett Station residents of the odors 
emanating from the site, Texas revoked the permit and French Limited 
ceased operations at the location.9 
The potential environmental dangers offered by the French Limited 
site included contamination of air, soil, surface water and ground water, 
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including two aquifers. Those dangers had an impact on the more than 
10,000 residents living in Barrett Station, Riverdale, and Crosby. Mil-
lions more area residents would be affected in a worst-case scenario, for 
the deep aquifers under the French Limited site provided drinking water 
for portions of the city of Houston. The nearest residence was within 300 
feet of the main pit, and the nearest drinking water well was within 1,500 
feet. The main pit lay directly above two important fresh water zones, the 
Chicot and Evangeline aquifers. Only a 70 foot thick band of low perme-
ability clay separated the pit from the aquifers. 10 
Descriptions by residents of the affects of the toxic waste dump on 
their lives grew more frightening over time. The northwestern portion of 
Barrett Station was informally known as Dream land. Residents of that 
neighborhood, located closest to the French Limited site, remembered 
an idyllic existence before the establishment of the dump in 1966. Long 
time Barrett Station resident Jake McAllister recalled, "Dreamland was 
the most beautiful community in Barrett at the time .... Trees appeared 
to stay green all year long. Flower gardens were almost a must in every 
yard .... As a kid, my friends and I would go swimming in the [San Ja-
cinto] river at least twice a week during swim season." Henry Miller re-
ported, "I lived here in Barrett Station all my life and this place was very 
clean. This was the church baptizing place. I swam, played, hunted and 
fished in these places." Lavinia Provost stated, "During the early 1960s 
and 1970s we did a lot of fishing, crabbing, swimming and picked berries 
[near the San Jacinto River.] My husband bought and hauled sand from 
the sand pit in that area to our home to be used in our yard and garden." 
Those who lived in the white Riverdale community prior to the dump-
ing of chemicals near their homes had similar fond memories. Margaret 
Whiddon, who moved there with her family in 1962, recalled, "The area 
was very beautiful. ... Our families ... would come out to have picnics, 
hunt, fish, and have family reunions. It was the perfect place." 11 
In 1966, the dumping of industrial wastes began at French Limited 
and changed those bucolic memories. Over the next 8 years, 95 compa-
nies used the site to dispose of their liquid industrial wastes. Among them 
were the largest refining and chemical companies in the nation, including 
Amoco, Atlantic Richfield, Chevron, Diamond Shamrock, Exxon Refin-
ing, Exxon Chemicals, Goodyear, Gulf Oil, Kaiser Aluminum, Lubrizol, 
Pennwalt, Phillips, Tenneco, and Texaco. 12 
Immediately after dumping began, Barrett Station residents and their 
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neighbors smelled unpleasant odors but thought little of it, since unpleas-
ant odors were common in the area. The modern stench of oil refinery 
emissions replaced the odor of coal smoke in and around Houston. Res-
idents of nearby Baytown boasted of their Exxon Refinery and Chemi-
cal plant, the largest such complex in the entire world. Even more than 
Houston, Baytown owed its existence and prosperity to its refineries and 
chemical companies. Employment in such places was a matter of pride 
to their workers, and many Exxon employees wore their hard-hats around 
town after working hours as evidence of the status they enjoyed as Exxon 
workers. When newcomers complained of the odors wafting from the 
complex and asked what it was, the standard, joking retort from resi-
dents, many of whom were third and fourth generation Exxon employees, 
was, "That is the smell of money." This laissez faire attitude exhibited a 
willingness to sacrifice the environment and public health for economic 
gain. The trade-off was apparent in the way George Wallace, at the time 
the governor of Alabama, viewed a paper mill spewing its stench into the 
air. Like the views ofBaytown's citizenry, Wallace declared, "That's the 
smell of prosperity. Sure smells sweet, doesn't it?"13 
The new odors that plagued Barrett Station after 1966 represented 
only a small part of a larger problem. The tenor of comments by residents 
magnified as they noticed that particulate matter often accompanied the 
smells. Lavinia Provost recalled, "We began to notice this awful odor 
which seemed to start in late afternoon and lasted throughout the night .... 
During the late afternoons we could see what appeared to be dark clouds 
form and some type of gray particles floating about and fall to the ground. 
If clothes were hung out to dry, they would have this awful smell and the 
bed sheets would look gray in color." 14 
Wilbur Collins, a Barrett Station resident who later served as the 
president of the multiracial citizen's committee formed to investigate the 
site, lived in Barrett Station's Dreamland neighborhood. "There was only 
one house closer to the French Limited dump site than mine, and that was 
my neighbor next door. [We did not experience the flooding because] we 
were higher up. But, the fumes were very bad. During the winter time, 
the wind generally blows from the northwest. That put us right in line 
with those bad fumes. There was an awful odor with particles of some 
kind floating about, falling and leaving a residue .... We could no longer 
enjoy the things that we had enjoyed before such as outdoor barbeques, 
picnics in the backyard with family and friends .... Our children were not 
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able to play outside as they were accustomed to in the past because of 
rashes, burning eyes, headaches and a nauseous feeling. These types of 
discomforts were also experienced by the adults as well." He added, "I 
could paint my house white, and in six months the mildew would come 
through. [It occurred] only on the side closest to the dump site. The 
leaves on the trees in the neighborhood were all black." Collins emphat-
ically insisted that the rashes and sore throats caused by the chemicals 
that caused the odors and their visible manifestation in particulate matter 
were harbingers of more serious health problems. He still believes that 
many of the cancers that continue to be diagnosed in Barrett Station are 
directly attributable to the windborne chemicals breathed so long by local 
residents. 15 
The physical effects of breathing airborne chemicals cannot be ex-
aggerated. Environmental Protection Agency researcher Frederick Kutz 
stressed that humans were affected not only by what they ate, but by 
what they also breathed He stated, "I am convinced that the air plays a 
more significant role in human contamination than anyone thinks. The 
world thinks all the residues are from food. I think we are forgetting an 
important route of exposure in air. In the alveoli of the lungs there is only 
a one-cell layer between the air sac and the blood system. I think those 
chemicals can go right through that."16 
It is small wonder that the air-borne chemicals caused the rashes, 
sore throats and headaches described by so many residents at the time. 
What is surprising is that it was not worse. The toxicity of the airborne 
chemicals and particulate matter had effects on all living things. Wilbur 
Collins especially remembered the effect of the chemicals on the vegeta-
tion. "When we realized what was happening, the majority of the people 
stopped planting gardens. They are just now [in 2005] going back to 
planting gardens." Jake McAllister sadly insisted, "We did not think [as 
children] that one day the path we traveled to get to and from the river 
would be considered unsafe, nor did we think that the berries we would 
eat on our way home could possibly be contaminated." 17 
Problems such as those being experienced at Barrett Station were 
common wherever toxic waste dumps lay in close proximity to residen-
tial neighborhoods. The people of Alsen, Louisiana, a few miles north 
of Baton Rouge on the Mississippi River, could have sympathized with 
the plight of Barrett Station residents. The testimony of Alsen resident 
Mary Mccastle was eerily similar to that of the black Texans. Mccastle 
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recalled, "We didn't know what they were dumping. We did know it was 
making us sick. People used to have nice gardens and fruit trees. They 
lived off their gardens and only had to buy meat. Not after Rollins [waste 
disposal service] came. Our gardens and animals were dying out. Some 
days the odors from the plant would be unbearable. We didn't know what 
was causing it. We later found out that Rollins was burning hazardous 
waste." 18 
The use of coal, oil and natural gas as fuels for industry, for inter-
nal combustion engines, and for home heating and cooking made petro-
leum-based fuels the nation's greatest pollution sources in the years lead-
ing up to World War II. The continued use of coal raised levels of soot 
particulates, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides in the air. However, cur-
rent studies indicate that except for plating, smelting, and certain refinery 
waste, most persistent and toxic industrial wastes remained manageable 
until the 1930s, largely because the volumes produced were relatively 
small. 19 
But new pre- and post-World War II technologies introduced new 
types and greater amounts of chemical compounds, especially into Amer-
ica's petrochemical industry. Many of those new synthetic building 
blocks for plastics, chemicals, drugs, food additives, fabrics, and pesti-
cides, such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), polybrominated biphe-
nyls (PBBs), and dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane (DDT), proved to 
be causal agents for cancer, brain damage and liver failure. Additionally, 
and unlike the wastes emitted by older, heavier industries, these synthetic 
materials tended to decompose more slowly and therefore remained in 
a hazardous state much longer. Rain no longer washed clean American 
skies and soil. However, a new governmental organization came into 
being whose purpose was to act as a check on the unfettered introduction 
of toxins into the environment.20 
In the post-World War Two years, conservationists, unions, and pri-
vate citizens began to band together to voice their unease about the state 
of the environment and its affect on public health. By the late 1960s, such 
concerns became political issues and resulted in the passage in Congress 
of legislation such as the National Environmental Policy Act (1969), the 
Clean Air Act (1970), and the Clean Water Act (1972). In reaction to 
those concerns, and with a specific regard to the long-term impact of dan-
gerous and long-lived chemicals, the United States government in 1970 
also established the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Speaking 
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of the long and intimate relationship between the United States govern-
ment and corporate America, sociologist Daniel Faber and economist 
James O'Connor claimed that the EPA was created "to bypass traditional 
federal agencies captured by corporate interests and to introduce a modi-
cum of democracy within the state bureaucracy."21 
All such legislation provided some relief for the environment, but the 
largest changes began in 1976 with the passage of the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and continued in 1980 with the pas-
sage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), but known to one and all as the Superfund. 
RCRA controlled the new generation of municipal solid waste and indus-
trial hazardous waste, while CERCLA concerned itself with toxic wastes 
generated in the past. CERCLA was to be funded by a tax on the chem-
ical industry and it contains extensive provisions for cost recovery from 
potentially responsible parties.22 
The EPA determined and published a list of chemicals that present 
threats to human health. The list, referred to as the Priority Pollutants 
List, identified 129 chemicals as "priority pollutants." Of those chemi-
cals, 114 were organic chemicals and most of those were of a synthetic 
nature. Additionally, the agency created a "maximum contaminant level" 
database, an attempt to indicate the amounts of each chemical necessary 
to pose threats to human health. Such action became necessary because 
most of the chemicals on the Priority Pollutants List were known or sus-
pected carcinogens linked to cancer or chemicals suspected of causing 
central nervous system or reproductive system damage. Chemicals dis-
playing such characteristics were present in the pit at the French Limited 
site near Barrett Station.23 
Dumping in the sandpit at French Limited presented a chance for 
other problems as well. Groundwater seepage into the sand pit created 
a lagoon, which indicated how close the ground water table came to the 
surface of the land. French Limited poured most of the liquid chemi-
cal wastes into that lagoon. Because of the high volume of chemicals 
introduced into the lagoon over time, a thick layer of chemical sludge 
eventually covered the bottom of the sand pit. The layer contained high 
concentrations of organic materials, as well as concentrations of metals. 
With the creation of the sludge layer, it was simply a matter of time before 
the toxic materials found their way into the ground water above the low 
permiability clay layer separating higher ground water from the lower 
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aquifers. That is exactly what happened, as the liquids soaked into the 
soil under the lagoon.24 
With the introduction of dangerous chemicals into the groundwa-
ter around the sand pit, the types of dangers faced by local residents in-
creased. Not only did they continue to face noxious airborne particles 
and chemicals, which they could see, smell, or consume through con-
taminated garden crops, but their drinking water now exposed them to 
the same chemicals. The revelation of the potential risks to the air and 
water at French Limited should have surprised no one. However, prior to 
World War II, the relationship between contaminants and groundwater so 
seldom entered scientific debate as to be almost non-existent.25 
By the time the Environmental Protection Agency interceded at the 
French Limited site, that relationship between contaminants and ground-
water was well documented. By then, scientists knew of the propensity 
of chemicals to percolate through soil toward underlying groundwater. 
The American Water Works Association, as early as the 1950s, published 
findings resulting from an investigation that illustrated the link between 
agricultural chemicals used in surface applications and their later appear-
ance in groundwater supplies. If chemicals are capable of travel from the 
surface down to the groundwater, how much easier is the process if the 
migration begins in a permeable sandpit?26 
Exposure to the chemicals contained within the lagoon came about 
in ways other than through the air. One of the normal risks accepted by 
Riverdale property owners was the danger of flooding. Living within 
the flood plain of the San Jacinto River, in what locals referred to as the 
"river-bottom," meant accepting the likelihood of occasional flooding. 
Residents prepared for such events by constructing their homes on lots 
with higher elevations due to the use of extra fill-dirt for the foundations, 
building on high piers, or building on stilts. Residents who took none 
of those precautions accepted periodic floodwaters sweeping into their 
homes as a fact of life. When floodwaters made the use of roads impos-
sible, residents resorted to the use of boats for transportation from their 
homes to U.S. Highway 90, where they parked their cars during such 
events. When the water receded and the rain washed away the silt and 
mud left behind by the floodwaters, life seemingly returned to normal. 
The French Limited site changed the regular cycle of flood preparation, 
flooding, and naturally occurring cleanup, to create a "new normal." 
Naomi Rodriguez of Riverdale spoke about how rising floodwaters 
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topped the levee surrounding the French Limited site and carried the con-
tents of the lagoon away with the river current. She remembered, "When 
it flooded in 1972-1973, there was a thick oily substance that covered our 
garden, ruined all our clothes, ruined our home. It covered the walls and 
furniture in my home. None of it [her belongings] was salvageable. This 
was the overflow from the pit, and of course it had a chemical odor too. 
The smell seemed to decrease at times, and then it would flood again and 
the odor would increase. It just soaked into our soil more and more with 
each flood." Those who lived near the San Jacinto river bottom had no 
champion, however, for the dumping continued as the facility remained 
open and no governmental agency at any level had yet considered inter-
vening at the site.27 
Although unable to yet name the specific chemicals causing the air 
pollution problems in their neighborhoods, Barrett Station residents knew, 
based on the effects of particulate matter and odor-causing chemicals, 
that something was seriously amiss. During the time of active dumping at 
French Limited, the people had no way to prove their suspicions scientifi-
cally. Even though dumping ended in 1972, testing of the site did not oc-
cur until 1983. The contaminants remained in the sandpit, leaching into 
the groundwater, and waiting for the next inevitable flood to sweep the 
chemicals over the levee and into the river bottom and the homes of local 
residents. In this case, to paraphrase Marshall McLuhan, the medium was 
the message since sand, the medium into which the toxic materials were 
being dumped lent itself to disaster. 
An eventual study of America's most dangerous toxic waste dumps, 
one that included an examination of the French Limited site, claimed sand 
to be "the most fragile of all ground containments." Indeed, when tests 
later revealed the ingredients of the deadly chemical cocktail contained 
within the French Limited lagoon, the same tests indicated the seepage of 
the witches brew into the groundwater, separated from the aquifers that 
supplied water to millions of residents by only 70 feet of clay.28 
During the years between 1973, when French Limited ceased oper-
ations and the 1980s when remediation of the site began, Barrett Station 
residents and their neighbors enjoyed relief from the odors and health 
problems previously experienced from airborne pollutants. With the ces-
sation of operations, the agitation of the lagoon waters stopped and the la-
goon remained undisturbed by human influence, creating an environment 
where the odors ceased.29 
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goon remained undisturbed by human influence, creating an environment 
where the odors ceased.29 
Due in part to the protests of Barrett Station residents, French Lim-
ited ended operations at the site ended when the state of Texas cancelled 
the operating permit for the site and ordered that operations cease. Tex-
as insisted that French Limited remove every item of equipment at the 
site, presumably to stop clandestine dumping. If that was the reason for 
Texas' demands, later events proved the wisdom of the decision. Wilbur 
Collins recalled with anger that French Limited, when denied the use 
of the original site by the state of Texas, simply moved their operation 
across Highway 90 about a half-mile away, and, armed with a new Texas 
permit, continued to dump, into a similarly abandoned sandpit. French 
Limited eventually deeded the original 22.5 acre site to the state of Texas. 
Another eight years passed after French Limited discontinued operations 
before the Environmental Protection Agency in December 1982, placed 
the site on its National Priorities list.30 
EPA test records, finally collected between February 1980 and June 
1983, contain factual but impersonal accounts of the conditions encoun-
tered at French Limited. The individual accounts of local residents speak 
emotionally of conditions downwind of the dump. It was left, however, 
to a team member from the Harris County Pollution Control Office, who 
had personally visited the site, to describe what he witnessed. The in-
spector testified, "They [French Limited] took about anything you would 
care to mention. Heavy metals, like cadmium, acids, chlorinated hydro-
carbons. When you approached the place you had the distinct feeling of 
descending into the netherworld. From quite a distance you could detect 
a smell so nauseating you had to wonder how anyone could live near it, 
and some people did live within a mile. When you got closer to the site, 
there were lagoons filled with a thick, black liquid. There were yellow 
and orange flames from grow1d flares; they were open burning some of 
the stuff." The dumping and disposal of the chemicals ended in 1973, but 
Barrett Station's fight extended well beyond that.3 
The fight continued in no small part because residents noticed a re-
turn of all the previous problems, In 1987, for example, area residents no-
ticed a return of all the previous problems, but this time with a vengeance. 
According to Barrett Station's Lavinia Provost, the odors went away until 
the late 1970s, when they returned. Wilbur Collins told the same story. 
"The odors subsided somewhat during the late 1970s until ... the odors 
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again." The same was true in Riverdale. This time it was the EPA, acting 
on behalf of the United States government, which was figuratively agitat-
ing the waters of the French Limited lagoon. The events that led to that 
latest round of air pollution had their roots in 1982.32 
A June 1982 flood on the San Jacinto River, reminiscent of earlier 
floods, overtopped the levee at the French Limited lagoon and enabled 
chemical-laced sludge once again to escape into the river. The pollution 
caused by the flood was not, of course, limited to the San Jacinto River 
and its environs. The San Jacinto flows into Trinity Bay, an inlet of the 
Gulf of Mexico. Trinity Bay is famous for its marine habitat, and is one 
of the nation's finest sources of oysters and shrimp. An Environmental 
Protection Agency Emergency Response Team removed 25 truckloads of 
sludge from the lagoon. How much escaped to do damage to the environ-
ment was unknown.33 
On April 13, 1983, and due in large part to the eye-opening escape 
of sludge during the June 1982 flood, the EPA provided the Texas Water 
Commission with funds to conduct an in-depth study of the French Limit-
ed site. The investigation, composed of Remedial Investigation (RI) and 
Feasibility Studies (FS), represented the first step in the long process of 
remediating the French Limited site. The purpose of the inquiry 
was to characterize the extent and degree of contamination of the 
site, to determine the potential for a release or threatened release of haz-
ardous materials from the site, and to develop and evaluate various cost 
effective remedial alternatives for the site. 
The completion of the Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Studies 
(RI/FS) for the site took almost four years. The EPA announced a public 
hearing at Crosby High School on May 21, 1987, to reveal the findings of 
the studies and to make known the various methods under consideration 
by the government in treating the chemical pollution at French Limited. 
The EPA announcement also asked for written comments from the public, 
accepted by the agency from May 11 until June 1, 1987. About 70 people 
attended the meeting. They requested that the waste should be taken to 
an offsite disposal facility rather than incinerated onsite.34 
As a result of that meeting, residents of Barrett Station and Riv-
erdale were for the first time not only made aware of the extent of the pol-
lution and the real dangers caused by dumping at the French Limited site, 
but were informed that the dangers had existed at least since 1979. The 
report revealed that the main areas of contamination were not limited to 
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the lagoon but extended to a slough north and west of the main pit. Con-
tamination in the slough resulted from a breach in the north levee of the 
lagoon during an April 1979 San Jacinto River flood. During that event, 
sludge flowed into the slough. When the water receded, much of the 
sludge remained behind, concentrated on the banks of the slough. During 
periods of heavy rainfall, water levels in the slough rose and mixed with 
the sludge. The slough then acted as a conduit through which flowed the 
resulting contaminated water. Tests revealed the presence of PCB con-
taminants in the water of a popular fishing spot near the lagoon, and in the 
flesh of fish caught there. Although the levels were below Food and Drug 
Administration guidelines for human consumption, it gave little comfort 
to those locals who had frequently consumed fish caught in those waters 
during the years when dumping took place. 35 
The shallow groundwater around the main pit was "heavily contami-
nated," due to seepage, but fortunately it had not reached the deeper aqui-
fers. Estimates suggested that the 70 foot thick low-permeability clay 
separating the shallow groundwater from the deeper aquifers would serve 
as a permanent barrier to future contamination, even if the site remained 
unremediated. However, and of great concern, shallow groundwater con-
tamination extended as far as 1,000 feet to the south and southeast of the 
site, in the direction of Barrett Station.36 
The Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Studies offered 5 reme-
diation methods, all created by using six factors required by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency. The six were: 1) consistency with oth-
er environmental laws, 2) reduction of toxicity, mobility or volume, 3) 
implementation ability, 4) cost, 5) community acceptance, and 6) state 
acceptance. 37 
Remediation Method One suggested the complete incineration of 
all contaminated soils and sludges, neutralizing the resulting ash and 
the use of it to backfill the lagoon. The plan recommended the treat-
ment of any contaminated surface water, and the subsequent discharge 
of the treated water directly to the San Jacinto River. The cost of 
Alternative One was an estimated $120 million. Remediation Method 
Two suggested the incineration of the sludge only, with contaminated 
soils chemically fixed and left in place. The same methods of treating 
contaminated surface water used in Method One would occur in Method 
Two. The cost of Method Two was an estimated $75 million. Remedi-
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ation Method Three suggested the containment of the contaminants by 
the use of slurry walls around the site and a multi-layered cap. The same 
methods of treating surface water used in Methods One and Two would 
occur in Method Three. The cost of Method Three was an estimated 
$43 million. Remediation Method Four was the "no-action" alternative. 
Superfund regulations required that "no-action" be considered as an al-
ternative to any project. Alternative Four suggested that a fence be con-
structed around the perimeter of the site and that groundwater monitoring 
equipment be installed. The cost of Alternative Four was an estimated 
$500,000. Alternative Five suggested the use of aerobic, indigenous bac-
teria to biodegrade the waste contained within the lagoon, with air emis-
sion controls in place. The same methods of treating surface water used 
in Methods One, Two and Three would occur in Method Five. Residues 
resulting from the biodegrading of the lagoon waste would be buried on 
site, and the lagoon backfilled with clean soil and contoured to promote 
drainage. A pump system would pump and treat water from the aquifer 
under the site, and a monitoring system would evaluate the quality of the 
water in the aquifers for 30 years. A cost estimate for Method Five was 
not stated at the time, but $49 million proved to be the price for bioreme-
diation.38 
The Environmental Protection Agency evaluated and assigned a rat-
ing to each alternative, running from "++" (greatest success assured), to 
"+" (partial success assured), "-" (limited success assured, with a danger 
of failure), and"--" (unacceptable risk.) Methods One and Five received 
ratings of"++." Method Two received a"+." Method Three received a 
"-," and Method Four graded as a"- -."39 
The Environmental Protection Agency initially preferred Method 
One, which involved the excavation and complete incineration of all 
sludge and soil within the contaminated zones, as the method most like-
ly to create the best result. The agency expected total success in their 
efforts, and made no contingency plans for the future. They did, howev-
er, acknowledge that any unforeseen movement of contaminates to areas 
outside the boundaries of the French Limited site would result in addi-
tional actions. The target date for the total completion of the remediation 
plan was December 1993.40 
In 1983, during the same time that the Texas Water Commission re-
ceived funds for the studies, the Environmental Protection Agency also 
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busied itself determining the identity of the companies who dumped 
their industrial waste at the French Limited site. Participating compa-
nies eventually numbered 95, and the Environmental Protection Agency 
determined to hold them financially responsible for cleaning the site. Ac-
cordingly, the Environmental Protection Agency created the French Lim-
ited Task Group, which consisted of the polluting companies. In 1987, 
the French Limited Task Group realized that Method One, the complete 
incineration of all contaminated sludge and soil at the French Limited 
site and the method preferred by the Environmental Protection Agency, 
would cost a projected $120 million, all to be paid for by its members. As 
the result of that knowledge, the Task Group suggested that the Environ-
mental Protection Agency approve a series of tests by the Task Group, to 
ascertain the chances of success for the bioremediation contained within 
the"++" rated Method Five.41 
Accordingly, the French Limited Task Group signed an enforcement 
agreement with the Environmental Protection Agency to begin small-
scale bioremediation testing at the lagoon, based on Method Five. Meth-
ods One and Five of the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Studies (RI/ 
FS) report indicated equal success from both methods. However, Method 
Five, biomediation, was adjudged by members of the French Limited Task 
Group to be the most cost-effective-in other words, cheaper- and there-
fore the preferred method. Members of the Task Group not only heavily 
favored the less expensive method, but also lobbied the Environmental 
Protection Agency as the Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Studies 
report was developed, and "requested that EPA give serious consideration 
to a biological treatment concept for the site." The Environmental Pro-
tection Agency signed an agreement with the French Limited Task Group 
on March 11, 1987, allowing the group to "undertake a pilot scale testing 
of biological treatment systems on the site." The specific purpose of the 
pilot test was to determine if biological treatment met all applicable, rele-
vant and appropriate state and federal requirements. Pilot bioremediation 
testing by the Task Group began at the site in April 1987.42 
A month later, in May, 1987, and coincidental to the onset of the pi-
lot testing program at the lagoon, the French Limited Task Group began 
a massive public relations campaign designed to advise the public about 
the remediation then beginning at French Limited. On May 13, 1988, 
the Task Group, accompanied by representatives from the Environmental 
Protection Agency, met with community leaders. Nine similar meetings 
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took place between June 11, 1987 and February 17, 1988. Representa-
tives of the Task Group and the Environmental Protection Agency attend-
ed all of the community leader meetings. Well attended public meetings 
also occurred during the summer and fall of 1987.43 
The use of engineered bioremediation as a method to clean up petro-
chemicals and organic chemicals is traceable to a pipeline spill in Penn-
sylvania in 1975. The concept is rather simple. Microorganisms, referred 
to as "bugs," prosper on a diet of organic chemicals. Different bugs enjoy 
different chemicals, so efforts are made to match specific bugs to a par-
ticular organic food. The process, called biodegradation, is a self-con-
trolling system. As long as contaminants exist, the bugs thrive and mul-
tiply. As they eat the organic chemicals, the contaminants consumed by 
the bugs are neutralized. When the chemicals are completely consumed, 
the bug population dies from starvation. Because the bugs are aerobic, 
they require oxygen to survive. Aeration equipment roils the water and 
brings bugs, food and oxygen into close contact.44 
In April 1987, the French Limited Task Group drove a sheet-metal 
wall into the lagoon, dividing it into a large and a small section. The Task 
Group used the smaller section as a pilot plant to ascertain how success-
ful the bioremediation of the entire lagoon might be. Tests conducted by 
French Limited Task Group scientists indicated that microorganisms al-
ready present in the lagoon as the proper bugs to accomplish the task. The 
French Limited Task Group installed the aeration equipment and began 
their test program. In October 1987, the test ended and the Task Group 
issued their report on the effectiveness of bioremediation. The report 
described in glowing terms the success of the pilot program, claiming an 
85 per cent reduction in the volume of hydrocarbon materials found in 
the sludge of the lagoon during the six month life of the test program.45 
The Environmental Protection Agency accepted the report, and on 
January 21, 1988, announced a change of heart. They chose bioreme-
diation, the cheaper method favored by the Task Group, rather than the 
incineration earlier favored by the Agency, as the method implemented 
by the U.S. government to clean up the toxic wastes at French Limited. 
If, as earlier referenced, Daniel Faber and James O'Connor were right 
concerning the reasons for the creation of the Environmental Protection 
Agency--that it existed as a mechanism to disconnect federal agencies 
from corporate influence--then events at the French Limited site indicated 
a return to the days of close, almost symbiotic relationships between the 
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federal government and corporate America. Local residents showed in-
creasing concern about whose side the Environmental Protection Agency 
was on. Wilber Collins candidly recalled, "We had mixed emotions over 
that. Sometimes we thought they were trying to help us, and sometimes 
we thought they were trying to help the chemical companies."46 
The Environmental Protection Agency in making its announcement 
also encouraged written comments on the decision, and asked that all such 
comments be in the hands of the agency no later than February 23, 1988. 
Additionally, the agency advertised in Houston and local newspapers the 
scheduling of a public meeting, to be held in Crosby on February 11, 
1988. Representatives of the Environmental Protection Agency, the State 
of Texas, and the French Limited Task Group met with approximately 
150 area residents. Those attending the meeting included residents of 
Barrett Station, Riverdale and Crosby. Those citizens repeated their ear-
lier desire that Method One, removal of the sludge and contaminated soil 
followed by off-site incineration, be the final method of remediation. As 
it turned out, and due to disturbing recent events, those citizens had a 
legitimate complaint.47 
During the bioremediation pilot tests conducted at the French Limit-
ed sited by the French Limited Task Group, aeration equipment provid-
ed the oxygen required by the microorganisms to eat the organic waste 
contained within the lagoon. The process introduced oxygen into pipes 
strategically placed in the lower levels of the lagoon. As the oxygen 
escaped from holes located in the pipes, it traveled upward toward the 
surface and in so doing aerated the water. A side effect of the bubbling 
action was the roiling of the water. This agitated not only the water but 
also the sludge. Toxins contained within the sludge, previously permitted 
to lie undisturbed on the bottom of the lagoon, now mixed with the rising 
air bubbles. The bubbles effervescing to the surface, released the toxins 
into the air. The suggested solution to the problem recreated the same 
conditions. 48 
Nearby residents again experienced the same nauseating odors and 
side effects as those endured years earlier. Barrett Station's Lavinia Pro-
vost testified, "The odor came back. Even though we had air conditioning 
at this time, the odors still came into the house." Provost also remarked 
on how the toxic waste dump at French Limited changed her life. She 
said, "Today . . .I would not fish, go out on picnics, nor would I eat any 
of the fish from that area. The trees are dead and the water has a dark 
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green coating that looks like slime on the surface." Wilber Collins' story 
dovetailed with that of Provost. He recalled, "The odors returned and the 
particles fell on our homes, lawn and cars had also returned and all of the 
discomforts we had endured before started all over again."49 
Early testing confirmed the presence of many dangerous chemicals, 
but further testing revealed their concentrations. Polychlorinated biphe-
nols (PCBs) existed in concentrations far above the maximum allowed 
by Environmental Protection Agency standards. Tests indicated 12 per 
cent of all sludge to be contaminated with PCBs. Furthermore, the PCB 
contaminated sludge could not be "practically separated" from the un-
contaminated sludge. Treatment of all sludge required the removal of all 
the sludge. Tests also indicated the presence of pesticide residues such 
as DDT. The list of the dangerous chemicals contained (however poorly) 
within the lagoon also included heavy metals such as chromium, copper, 
nickel, and lead, all of whose concentrations far exceeded Environmental 
Protection Agency EPA guidelines regarding acceptable maximum heavy 
metal levels in the environment. A combination of toxic chemicals and 
heavy metals glutted the French Limited site. 50 
The long-term removal of contaminants, although important, be-
came secondary in the minds ofresidents during the February 11, 1988, 
meeting. Their immediate concerns about odors, nausea, rashes, sore 
throats, peeling paint, contaminated fish and dying trees, brought to the 
fore during the pilot bioremediation tests conducted by the French Lim-
ited Task Group, trumped any potential problems with what to do with 
the material after its removal. Residents from the beginning preferred 
that the site be excavated, and that the resulting material be transported 
to another location for incineration. The original plan of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency was similar in most respects to the wishes of 
the communities. It also provided for excavation and incineration of the 
site, but with the incineration occurring there at French Limited. Now 
the government, in changing its mind and accepting a plan suggested by 
the very companies who had originally polluted the site, reintroduced 
the side effects reminiscent of those which brought the agency onto the 
scene in the first place. Citizens continued to wonder which side the 
Environmental Protection Agency was on. It seemed that the agency 
was moving away from holding the French Limited Task Group ac-
countable for their past actions. Outrage among local citizens resulted, 
and a question/answer session conducted at the meeting by Environ-
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mental Protection Agency representatives did not assuage their opposi-
tion to the new plan. 51 
Some researchers, while not defending the actions of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, have attempted to understand why it seems 
that the agency acts against the best interests of those it should defend. 
The answer suggested that, because of lawsuits brought against regula-
tory agencies by citizens and corporations, entities such as the Environ-
mental Protection Agency use the bureaucracy of which they are a part 
to shield themselves from criticism. The results take the form of "formal 
public hearings that are limited in scope to discussions of the technical 
merits of a proposal," rather than to a more sympathetic appraisal of the 
effects of a toxic waste dump such as the French Limited site on the 
health and lives of complainants.52 
Local residents busied themselves with planning legal action while 
the pilot testing occurred. Representatives from the neighborhoods in 
close proximity to the French Limited site had organized into a citizens 
group in order to offer a unified front to the EPA and the French Limit-
ed Task Group. Wilbur Collins represented Barrett Station and served 
as the overall president, while Melvin Whiddon represented Riverdale. 
The citizens of Crosby affected by the pollution created their own sepa-
rate group. Anthony Roisman, an attorney whose firm, Cohen, Millstein 
and Hausfield, represented the Barrett Station and Riverdale group, re-
called, "They worked together very well. It was a unique example of 
racial, cultural, and economic cooperation." The willingness of residents 
of Barrett Station and Riverdale to create an alliance to face imminent 
dangers shared by everyone in the area was unprecedented in its scope. 
Sociologists say that people faced with common problems tend to work 
together to forge common solutions, resulting in a more homogeneous ra-
cial makeup within the grassroots environmental groups now in existence 
across the United States, but especially in the South.53 
As marginalized people became aware of the dangers offered by pol-
lution and toxic waste, they also tended to realize that their agenda and 
that of the more traditional environmentalists did not necessarily agree. 
In fact, in many cases, the dumping of toxic wastes into poor neighbor-
hoods was not an important concern among established environmental-
ists, whose main concern was NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard). Dumping 
in any area except in one's own was acceptable. A natural affinity over 
environmental issues and strategies did not generally exist between the 
73 
EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL JOURNAL 
economically advantaged and the economically disadvantaged. It took 
several decades, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, before the two groups 
began to experience "any significant convergence."54 
The area citizens groups retained local legal counsel, but that firm 
almost immediately realized the scope of the task to be beyond their ca-
pacity to perform. In 1987 they requested the assistance of the Washing-
ton, D. C., firm of Cohen, Millstein and Hausfield to evaluate the health 
affects of the dump on local residents. They also evaluated the property 
damage caused by contact with the air and waterborne chemicals and 
gathered evidentiary depositions that described life in the community be-
fore and after the dumping began.55 
Another tool used by the attorneys was two petition drives, one in-
volving residents of the Dreamland neighborhood of Barrett Station and 
the other involving their neighbors. The two petitions, addressed to the 
United States Assistant Attorney General for Land and Natural Resourc-
es and signed by a total of 90 residents, asked for Justice Department 
intervention at the French Limited site. Specifically, the petitions laid 
responsibility for the new health concerns directly on the pilot bioremedi-
ation program conducted by the French Limited Task Group. The Barrett 
Station petition was reminiscent of the attitude of past residents who, 
when pushed too far, ultimately stood up for their rights as citizens. They 
wrote, "We feel we can no longer sit idly by and not do anything to at-
tempt to put a halt to this activity."56 
Cohen, Millstein and Hausfield also retained the services of scien-
tists to examine all records accumulated by the Environmental Protection 
Agency to that point. Their goal became to compare actions taken at the 
site by the French Limited Task Group with standards created by the EPA 
itself and to ascertain if the use of bioremediation met all of its self-im-
posed regulations. Linda Greer, Ph.D., Health Program Director of the 
National Resources Defense Council, and Thomas Overcamp, Ph.D., of 
Clemson University, became important voices on behalf of Barrett Sta-
tion and Riverdale residents.57 
Dr. Greer concerned herself with the effectiveness of bioremedia-
tion at the French Limited site and questioned the veracity of the French 
Limited Task Group pilot test results that claimed an 85 per cent re-
duction of hydrocarbon levels at the site. In fact, Greer claimed that 
the method used by the Task Group was not bioremediation at all but a 
combination of bioremediation and air stripping. Bioremediation, she 
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reported, actually destroyed organic contaminants and rendered them 
non-toxic, while air stripping, or the volatilization of the chemicals con-
tained within the lagoon's waters, merely transfers the contaminants 
from the lagoon to the air. The air stripping, Dr. Greer reported, caused 
the new round of odor and side effects that occurred during the pilot test 
phase. She also called into question the opinion of the Environmental 
Protection Agency that both Methods One and Five received equal suc-
cess ratings in the Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study, they 
purported that bioremediation to be as effective as excavation and in-
cineration. She insisted that the only circumstances under which the 
success of bioremediation possibly approached the success of excava-
tion and removal was to team bioremediation with air stripping, just 
as the French Limited Task Group was doing. However, Greer main-
tained, such a combination was not included in the definition of biore-
mediation as developed by the Environmental Protection Agency itself. 
Furthermore, Greer considered the agency guidelines to be very clear 
about the efficacy of the two methods. She used the words of the agen-
cy as a weapon against itself when she cited the Record of Decision, the 
document that announced the switch from excavation and incineration 
to bioremediation. Even that document acknowledged that biodegrada-
tion only reduced contaminants, while incineration destroyed them. As 
a result, even the Environmental Protection Agency in its own official 
documents admitted the inefficacy of bioremediation. 58 
Additionally, Greer reported that even if bioremediation was nor-
mally as effective as excavation and incineration, circumstances at the 
French Limited site precluded such success. The success ofbioremedi-
ation depends on a stable population of microorganisms happily eating 
their way through the targeted wastes. However, the very nature of 
the French Limited wastes was deadly to the normal life cycle of the 
preferred bugs. Greer insisted that, contrary to the claims of the French 
Limited Task Group that the necessary bugs were already present at the 
site, that the nature of the deadly chemicals was in fact hostile to the 
continued existence of the microorganisms. The chemicals did away 
with the bugs, rather than the bugs doing away with the chemicals . 
Bioremediation, as defined by the Environmental Protection Agency, in 
Greer's opinion, was doomed to failure. 59 
Why then, did the French Limited Task Group and the Environmental 
Protection Agency insist on bioremediation as the remedy of choice at 
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the French Limited site? It seems that money was the answer. Meth-
od One, the excavation and incineration remedy originally favored by 
the agency, carried a projected cost of $120 million. Method Five, the 
bioremediation remedy suggested by the French Limited Task Group and 
belatedly approved by the Environmental Protection Agency, ultimately 
cost $49 million. The agency became a victim of its own ratings game, 
for it claimed equal chances of success for both Methods One and Five. 
It is no surprise that the French Limited Task Group, faced with equal 
success no matter the option, supported the remedy that saved them $71 
million. 
But, as important as it was to the French Limited Task Group to save 
$71 million, they faced the threat of a catastrophic additional financial 
obligation that dwarfed the saving of a mere $71 million. Attorneys for 
the citizens group claimed that the French Limited Task Group was in 
a race against time. Excavation and incineration took more time than 
bioremediation. Time became the enemy, for every day that passed with-
out a solution further endangered the life and health of Barrett Station res-
idents, and brought the possible contamination of the Houston metropoli-
tan area's water supply that much closer. The latter disaster would make 
the cleansing of the French Limited site seem simple and inexpensive. It 
is little wonder that the Task Group favored what they considered to be a 
quick fix remedy, made even faster through the implementation of higher 
aeration levels. Barrett Station residents had a different agenda, however. 
While it was true that they too desired a speedy solution to the problem, 
they refused to accept further exposure to the chemicals at the French 
Limited site while bioremediation took place. They insisted, "You can't 
make it into a problem that we have to breathe just because you want to 
speed up the rate at which the bugs eat."60 
It became obvious to residents of Barrett Station and their neighbors 
that neither the Environmental Protection Agency nor the French Lim-
ited Task Group planned to return to excavation and incineration as the 
remedy for the site. It became equally apparent that high aeration levels, 
resulting in air pollution, odors and health problems, would be a part of 
the remediation process once the main attempt began. Accordingly, the 
citizen's group, acting on behalf of more than 300 residents including 
120 property owners from Barrett Station, Riverdale and Crosby, brought 
a class action lawsuit against the agency and the French Limited Task 
Group, asking for relief from the effects of bioremediation.6 1 
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The lawsuit acknowledged that asking the court to intervene and 
grant the people relief from decisions made by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency and the French Limited Task Group was an extraordinary 
action. But, as the Barrett Station residents insisted, the citizens affected 
by bioremediation were the true parties of interest, and it was for their 
benefit that the clean up of the French Limited Dump Site should be ac-
complished. Bioremediation evidence compiled by Dr. Linda Greer, as 
well as the air quality study conducted by Dr. Thomas Overcamp accom-
panied the petition and played a significant role in the decision by the 
agency and the French Limited Task Group to settle out of court with the 
group from Barrett Station and Riverdale. Attorney Anthony Roisman 
remembered, "I think, frankly, that is why these companies eventually 
settled with us."62 
In fact, the reports by Drs. Greer and Overcamp proved so damn-
ing that the French Limited Task Group settled with the citizen's group 
before the case ever went to trial, avoiding the possibility of a larger set-
tlement determined by a sympathetic jury. The settlement's terms gave 
something to each party. It pleased the Task Group by making it possible 
to maintain bioremediation as the official remedy rather than the slower 
excavation and incineration remedy. The settlement also contained sev-
eral features important to local residents. First was a monetary consider-
ation. A cash settlement consisted of $4.7 million, from which expenses 
and attorney's fees came first. The remainder, divided among the lawsuit 
participants, used factors such as proximity to the site and length of res-
idence to determine individual awards. The terms of the settlement pre-
vented any further legal action by any of the participants.63 
That the settlement did not include cancellation of the bioremediation 
remedy and a return to the original plan of excavation and incineration 
was a disappointment to the Barrett Station residents. But it pleased them 
that the settlement included an agreement by the French Limited Task 
Group to use Texas Air Quality Board standards to closely monitor emis-
sions, especially benzene and vinyl chloride, coming from the lagoon. 
The only possible way to simultaneously use bioremediation meet the 
state standards was to back off on the intensity of the aeration. This 
satisfied local residents in two ways-it lowered the amount of toxic 
chemicals in the air they breathed, and it eliminated the noxious odors 
previously created by turbulent aeration.64 
The citizens of Barrett Station and their neighbors, to paraphrase the 
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Rolling Stones, did not get what they wanted, but they got what they 
needed. They wanted excavation and incineration at a separate site but 
were unsuccessful in achieving that goal. They needed relief from the 
air, soil and water pollution caused by rapid aeration so central to biore-
mediation at French Limited. In this regard, they did experience success. 
Aeration shutdown tied to constant air quality testing marked a return to 
something approaching normalcy in their lives. Compensatory awards 
for damages and health care removed, or at least ameliorated, financial 
burdens resulting from their exposure to the toxic wastes at the French 
Limited Superfund Site. 
The long-term impact of the French Limited site on the groundwater 
and underlying aquifers remain to be seen. All test results at the lagoon 
suggest that the danger to the aquifer is minimal. But all is not well in the 
areas surrounding the French Limited lagoon. As late as 2005, Wilbur 
Collins insists, the water in the river bottom swamps near the site does 
not have a healthy appearance. He considers lingering contamination in 
the soil a product of the overtopping of the levees by floods prior to reme-
diation to be the cause.65 
Health concerns in Barrett Station continue to plague residents. Col-
lins contends that many people are still developing cancer. "A lot of peo-
ple are dying from that deadly disease. There are several different kinds, 
and there has been talk that a lot of it is related to this dump out here." An 
independent study, conducted by the University of Texas Medical Branch 
in Galveston agreed with Collins with regard to heightened health risks. 
The study collected data from two groups of Barrett Station residents. 
The control group was composed of residents with limited exposure to 
the chemicals. The findings from that group were compared to data col-
lected from a second group, one with high exposure to the chemicals. 
The research revealed a meaningful difference between the two groups. 
Twice as many residents in the high-exposure group exhibited nerve re-
lated diseases than did those in the low-exposure group. The researchers 
concluded that, "The excess of neurological symptoms is consistent with 
the known toxic properties of the chemicals at the site." Tracking the 
health of Riverdale residents is difficult, for most of them moved away 
after the final monetary settlement was made at the conclusion of the 
community class action lawsuit.66 
The wisdom of the decision by the Environmental Protection Agency 
to implement the cost-saving bioremediation championed by the French 
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Limited Task Group, over the objections not only of local citizens but 
environmental experts as well will be proven by time. What is sure is 
that the people of Barrett Station and those few who still live in Riverdale 
will live with the consequences of the decision for decades to come, and 
if Wilbur Collins is correct, the legacy of French Limited may continue 
for generations. 
The people of Barrett Station were instrumental in bringing about a 
resolution to the remediation controversy at French Limited. Whether the 
decision to settle with the EPA and the French Limited Task Group was 
the wise choice, or whether the people should have fought on until they 
won a complete victory is still a topic of conversation in Barrett Station. 
What is certain, however, is that the residents of the community had once 
again fought against injustice, using all the resources they found at hand, 
and they claimed a partial victory. But the accomplished much more 
than the obvious. The multiracial coalition demonstrated a common front 
between Barrett Station residents and their neighbors, but it served to do 
more than simply bring the Environmental Protection Agency and the 
French Limited Task Group to heel. It acted as another balm to heal the 
historical wounds of mistrust and misunderstanding, even if on a small 
scale, between black and white residents residing on the east bank of the 
San Jacinto River. Whether the biracial coalition called into existence for 
the specific purpose offighting the Environmental Protection Agency and 
the French Limited Task Group holds together in the long term, or if the 
presence and success of that body in the community engendered other 
forms of biracial cooperation remains to be seen. What is certain is that 
the residents of Barrett Station, in the tradition begun by Harrison Bar-
rett in 1865, found yet another weapon, if only a temporary one, in their 
ongoing battle against injustice in all its forms. If using their past will-
ingness to fight against inequity is a reliable predictor of future success, 
then the people of Barrett Station will continue to fulfill the dreams of its 
founder and patriarch. Wilbur Collins softly confided, "Whenever I see a 
person who was a part of that group, I shake his hand. We are brothers."67 
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APPENDIX 
MEMBERS OF THE FRENCH LIMITED TASK GROUP 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, 
v. 
FRENCH LIMITED, INC. 
FRENCH LIMITED OF HOUSTON, INC. 
LUTHER P. HENDON, INDIVIDUALLY 
GEORGE A. WHITTEN, INDIVIDUALLY 
ALLIED-SIGNAL, INC. 
AMERADA HESS CORPORATION 
AMERICAN PLANT FOOD CORPORATION 
AMOCO GAS COMPANY 
ARCO CHEMICAL COMPANY 
ARMCO INC. 
ASHLAND CHEMICAL COMPANY 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY 
BERWIND RAILWAY SERVICE COMPANY 
BIEHL & COMPANY 
BIG THREE INDUSTRIES, INC. 
BROWN AND ROOT, INC. 
BROWNING-FERRIS INDUSTRIES, CHEMICAL SERVICES, AND AFFILIATES 
CAMCO,INC. 
CAMERON IRON WORKS USA, INC. 
CELOTEX CORPORATION 
CHAMBERS & KENNEDY 
CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 
CHAS. MARTIN INSPECTION AND CONTROLS, INC. 
CHEMICAL EXCHANGE INDUSTRIES, INC. 
CHEVRON CHEMICAL COMPANY (for GULF OIL CHEMICALS 
CORPORATION) 
CROWN CENTRAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION 
DIXIE CHEMICAL COMPANY 
DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 
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DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC. 
E.I.duPONT de NEMOURS & COMPANY, INC. 
EDDY REFINING COMPANY 
ETHYL CORPORATION 
EXXON CORPORATION, EXXON CHEMICALS AMERICA 
EXXON PRODUCTION RESEARCH COMPANY 
GATX TERMINALS CORPORATION 
GENERAL FOODS CORPORATION 
GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY 
W.R. GRACE & COMPANY 
GULF STATES ASPHALT, INC. 
HALLIBURTON SERVICES 
HERCULES INC. 
HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION 
Number 2 
HOUSTON NATURAL GAS CORPORATION (DIVISION OF HOUSTON 
PIPELINE) 
HUDSON ENGINEERING CORPORATION 
HUDSON PRODUCTS CORPORATION 
HUGHES DRILLING FLUIDS 
HUGHES TOOL COMPANY 
]. M. HUBER CORPORATION 
KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL CORPORATION 
KEITH, INC., MAINTENANCE ENGINEERING 
KOPPERS COMPANY, INC. 
LONE STAR GAS COMPANY 
LUBRIZOL CORPORATION 
MERCHANTS METALS, INC. 
MERICHEM COMPANY 
MILCHEM, INC. 
MITCHELL ENERGY CORPORATION 
NALCO CHEMICAL COMPANY 
NEWPARK SHIPBUILDING & REPAIR, INC. 
NL INDUSTRIES, INC. 
OAKITE PRODUCTS, INC. 
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OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION (successor to DIAMOND 
SHAMROCK) 
OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS CORPORATION 
PAKTANK CORPORATION 
PARKER BROTHERS & COMPANY, INC., (ALLIED FENCE) 
PENCE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
PENNWALT CORPORATION 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY 
PLASTIC APPLICATORS, INC. 
PLATZER SHIPYARDS 
POANGRA 
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. 
REICHHOLD CHEMICALS, INC. 
ROHM&HAAS 
E.WSAYBOLT & COMPANY, INC. 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY 
SOUTHWEST CHEMICAL SERVICES 
STAUFFER CHEMICAL COMPANY 
STEWART & STEVENSON SERVICES, INC. 
TENNECO (PETRO-TEX CHEMICAL CORPORATION & TENNECO 
POLYMERS) 
TEXACO, INC., & TEXAS-NEW MEXICO PIPELINE COMPANY 
TEXAS EASTERN PRODUCTS PIPELINE COMPANY 
TEXASGULF, INC. 
TEXAS STEEL AND WIRE CORPORATION 
UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 
VELSICOL CHEMICAL CORPORATION 
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